Another MH-47G ready for her last flight. 08-03786 was originally 70-15007, Boeing build number B-649, as a CH-47C helicopter. 70-15007 accumulated 2858.0 aircraft hours.

On 7 August 1991, 70-15007 was inducted into the E model program and converted to 92-00400. 92-00400, Boeing E model kit number M3708, was a MH-47E helicopter.
The U.S. Army acceptance date was 20 June 1994 and assigned to 160th SOAR(A). At some point 92-00400 had accumulated 4097.6 E model hours and 6955.6 total aircraft hours.

92-00400 was eventually inducted into the MH-47G program and converted to 08-03786 at 6955.6 aircraft hours. 08-03786 was assigned to 160th SOAR(A) and accumulated
3446.6 G model hours for a total of 10,402.2 aircraft hours.

Notice the new way to heat up a hot pocket when flying.

Gary Smith 4ballz.

Afghanistan Ethnicity:

Main minority or indigenous communities: no reliable current data on ethnicity in Afghanistan exists, though surveys have pointed to some rough estimates of the population. However, previous estimates have put the population at Pashtun 42 per cent, Tajik 27 per cent, Hazara 9 per cent, Uzbek 9 per cent, Turkmen 3 per cent, Baluchi 2 per cent and other groups making up the remaining 8 per cent.

Main languages: Dari (Farsi dialect, 50 per cent of the population) Pashtu (35 per cent) . Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) and other minority languages such as Aimaq, Ashkun, Baluchi, Gujari, Hazaragi, Kazaki and Moghili, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (alsana).

Main religions: Islam 99.7 per cent (Sunni 84.7 – 89.7 per cent, Shia 10-15 per cent, and other smaller sects), Sikhism, Hinduism, Judaism.

Aimaq

The Aimaq are mostly Sunni Muslim of the Hanafi branch, like the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Turkmen of Afghanistan. They speak a dialect of Persian mixed with Turkic vocabulary. While the Aimaq have traditionally been a nomadic people, they are gradually becoming semi-nomadic, travelling only in certain seasons. Their societal structure is based on the patriarchal nucleus family, which also defines their ethnic identity. Their main economic resource is carpet-weaving and, on a secondary basis, farming. Lacking in rich agricultural land some of them were nonetheless forced to choose to become farmers due to the drought in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the main source of economic wealth resulting from carpet-weaving, Aimaq culture still measures wealth through the number of heads of livestock.

Historical context

Being a nomadic people, the Aimaq, divided into their different sub-groupings have traditionally traversed through the entirety of Afghanistan and Iran. They are credited with participation in the defence of the state against the Soviet invasion, as well as being active in the ensuing civil war, on the side of the Mujahadin. Being a relatively small though diverse group with no real territorial base, there has not been any claim from the Aimaq for self-determination.

Their tribal and nomadic character has acted as a barrier from them ever becoming politically active, nor have they sought administrative power in any concerted manner. As a result, they have lacked the means through which to communicate their main very fundamental concern of survival under very difficult conditions.

Current issues

In contrast with other communities in rural Afghanistan, Aimaq women are accorded high status and are able to participate in group discussions with outsiders present, and have some degree of choice over whom they marry.

Although a numerically small ethnic group, Aimaq have gained positions in parliament. However, some Aimaq have expressed concern that the voter identification process would not allow them to identify as Aimaq, and rather, the government was going to force them to identify themselves as belonging to other smaller ethnicities, accusing the government of applying divide and rule tactics.

Baluch

Though their exact numbers are uncertain and as with other communities are contested, previous estimates have suggested that Baluchis make up around 2 per cent of the population. They are part of the larger Baluchi community, the majority of whom live across the border in Pakistan, and the rest live in Iran. The Baluchis of Afghanistan live in the pastoral lands of the south-west and south in Hilmand and Faryab Provinces and practise Sunni Islam. Their language is Baluchi, although some speak Brahui (who are known as Brahuis or Brahui Baluchis).

The Baluchis’ main economic activity is agriculture and animal husbandry. They are traditionally nomads and have preserved their ancient tribal structure with patriarchal, male-dominated kinship. Traditional and acquired skills have made them relatively self-sufficient, with the ability to build their own homes and develop the tools necessary for daily life. Rugs are woven for trade and household. Their farming activities follow a strict division of labour between women and men. Women work in groups threshing and separating the harvest while men are responsible for ploughing and planting. In keeping with Baluchi nomadic tradition, lands are not privately owned but belong to the whole tribe.

Historical context

Divided between three countries – Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan – the Baluchis are one of Asia’s classical cross-border minorities. They have a strong awareness of their ethnic identity which has resulted in several rebellions against their respective central governments in a bid to maintain their autonomy. While there has been a strong Baluchi pull for self-determination with the view to the formation of an independent Baluchistan, these demands have gradually faded through sustained political repression at the hands of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Unlike the Kurds’ struggle for independence the Baluchi struggle has rarely attracted attention in the outside world.

In the 1970s the strongest organised Baluch group in search of independence were the Baluch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). Most PLF guerrillas were based in training camps in southern Afghanistan and were reportedly given sanctuary by Daoud’s regime.

Current issues

Baluchis are one of the named ‘national’ ethnic minorities in the Afghan Constitution. Accordingly, they have all the rights bestowed to Afghan citizens. Nevertheless, Baluch leaders have expressed concern that their rights to their language have not been protected by the government, and that their children do not receive mother-tongue language education.

Hazard

The size of the Hazara population, as with other communities in Afghanistan, is highly uncertain as the country’s authorities have never conducted a national census of the population. However, it is broadly recognized that none of the country’s ethnic groups form a majority, and the exact percentages of each group as part of the national population are estimates and often highly politicized.

The size of the Hazara community has also declined significantly as a result of forced migration, land grabbing and persecution. They were once the largest Afghan ethnic group, constituting nearly two-thirds of the total population of the country before the 19th century. Some estimates suggest that more than half of the Hazaras were massacred, forced to flee or taken into slavery during the 1891-93 Hazara War when the Afghan King Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) led a genocidal campaign of violence against Hazaras. Many of the Hazaras who fled the persecution by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan settled in the Indian subcontinent or Iran, laying the foundation of the Hazara communities that now live in the Pakistani city of Quetta and various districts in Iran’s eastern provinces. These communities have increased in size as more Hazaras who fled from Afghanistan over the past four decades have settled within them, especially in Quetta.

The origins of the Hazara community are much debated. Although a common myth suggests that Hazaras originated from a contingent of the army of Genghis Khan in the 13th century, there is no historical evidence to support these claims. Other more plausible theories suggest that Hazaras are more likely to have descended from communities that inhabited the region well before the advent of Genghis Khan.

Hazaras speak a dialect of Dari (Farsi dialect) called Hazaragi and the majority of them follow the Shi’a (Twelver Imami) school of Islam. As a result, Shi’a Hazaras constitute a religious minority in a country where the majority practice Sunni Islam. Significant numbers of Hazaras are also followers of the Ismaili Shi’a school of Islam or are Sunni Muslims. Within Afghanistan, Hazaras are known for their distinctive music and literary traditions with a rich oral history, poetry and music. Hazaragi poetry and music are mainly folkloric, having been passed down orally through the generations.

In Afghanistan, the majority of Shi’a Hazaras live in Hazarajat (or ‘land of the Hazara’), which is situated in the rugged central mountainous core of Afghanistan with an area of approximately 50,000 square kilometres. The region includes the provinces of Bamyan and Daikundi and several adjacent districts in the provinces of Ghazni, Uruzgan, Wardak, Parwan, Baghlan, Samangan and Sar-e Pul. There are significant Sunni Hazara communities in the provinces of Badghis, Ghur, Kunduz, Baghlan, Panjshir and other areas in the northeast of Afghanistan. Ismaili Hazaras live in the provinces of Parwan, Baghlan and Bamyan. In addition, Shi’a as well as Sunni Hazaras are based in substantial numbers in several urban centres of Afghanistan, including Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.

Traditionally, the majority of the Hazara community were involved in subsistence farming or working as peasants and artisans. In Afghanistan’s cities, Hazaras traditionally engaged in unskilled labour as they faced discrimination in education and public sector employment. This has contributed to their further stigmatization, reflected in the low rate of intermarriage between Hazaras and members of other groups. Systematic discrimination, as well as recurrent periods of targeted violence and enforced displacement, have led the Hazara community to lose much of their population and standing in the social hierarchy of modern Afghanistan.

John and Chori Frosh
Jogi and Chori Frosh are semi-nomadic communities belonging to the larger Jat ethnic minority who trace their origins to Tajikistan and Pakistan, respectively, and have historically engaged in seasonal migration around Afghanistan and into neighbouring states. In recent years, these communities have become increasingly sedentary, with more established populations scattered across Afghanistan and in greatest concentration on the outskirts of the main cities of the country’s north. Although there is little recent or reliable information available regarding the size of Jogi and Chori Frosh communities in Afghanistan, estimates suggest they make up an estimated 20,000-30,000 people, including approximately 1,500 Jogi families and 350 Chori Frosh families spread across northern Afghanistan. The accuracy of these figures is further complicated by the impact of decades of conflict: this has disrupted the migratory patterns of Jogi and Chori Frosh communities, leading some to flee to other countries temporarily or permanently, or move to other areas of Afghanistan, such as outside Kabul in Charahi Qambar, where they live amongst other internally displaced and nomadic communities.

The lack of information surrounding Afghanistan’s Jogi and Chori Frosh communities points to the relative invisibility of the challenges they face, which stands in contrast to the visibility of their distinct cultural practices. Like the majority of Afghans, Jogi and Chori Frosh are Sunni Muslims, predominantly speaking Dari but also community-specific dialects. Despite these commonalities, Jogi and Chori Frosh communities are discriminated against on account of their ancestral origins and related social and economic practices, including high levels of female labour participation rates, for which they are considered ‘outsiders’. This has contributed to their severe economic, social and political marginalization, a situation exacerbated by the frequent denial of recognition of their citizenship.

It is important to note that the labels used to refer to these communities have been externally assigned and carry with them negative connotations, having become synonymous with the social categories imposed on what are in practice, disparate groups. The term ‘Jogi’, for example, is often used in a derogatory manner as a synonym for ‘beggar’ and bears similarity with other exonyms such as ‘gypsy’. Nevertheless, Jogi and Chori Frosh communities have increasingly adopted these labels for self-identification: for this reason and due to the lack of appropriate alternatives to effectively refer to these communities, these labels will be used with due recognition of their shortcomings.

https://youtu.be/59Yuo0kZDsk?si=f6ud_tn7UkjeJ0G7

Listen to these two experts on conditions in Afghanistan, the state of Afghan resettlement and future opportunities for education benefits.

Thanks to Khalid for his efforts, from the Fall In Team, for publishing this important information.